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THE	ABYSS		
International	Human	Rights	and	Freedom:	Possibilities,	Epistemologies,	Legacies	and	
Alternatives,	Queen	Mary	University	of	London,	31	October	–	1	November	2017			 Vanja	HAMZIĆ		How	might	one	think	limits	of	one’s	disciplinary	world	in	a	productive	way,	that	is,	with	 a	 view	 not	 to	 end	 up	with	 yet	 another,	 even	 if	 more	 expansive,	 disciplinary	cogito	 but	 rather,	 if	 you	 will,	 an	 epistemic	 abyss	 that	 opens	 to	 more	 radical	imaginings	of	what	 lies	ahead?	Is	there	an	external	to	 law	in	 legal	theory?	A	space,	even	 if	 but	 conceptual,	 that	 we	might	 designate	 as	 alegal?	 Or,	 what’s	 beyond	 the	grasp	 for	 social	 anthropology?	 A	methodological	 move	 from	 humans	 to	 things	 so	that	one	is	encouraged	to	 ‘think	from	things’	with	a	potential	to	transform,	in	turn,	the	entire	discipline	 into	 the	new	 field	of	 ‘pragmatology’?	Or,	 can	one	seize	on	 the	long	 impasse	 of	 the	 so-called	 empiricist	 history	 to	 suggest,	 as	 Saidiya	 Hartman	would	have	it,	the	need	for	critical	fabulation?			 My	work	to	date,	for	the	most	part,	intersects	these	three	disciplines	and	so	my	 provocation	 today	 is	 limited	 to	 them,	 although	 one	 can	 of	 course	 imagine	interrogating	 just	 about	 any	 cognate	 socio-humanistic	 ‘science’	 in	 this	 mode	 of	critique.	 At	 issue	 is	 not	 an	 exercise	 in	 interdisciplinarity,	 so	 that	 where	 one	disciplinary	end	is	found	one	moves,	methodologically,	on	to	another,	so	as	to	create	a	space	where	disciplines	help	each	other	survive.	I	propose,	rather,	to	pry	open	the	unknowable	 amidst	 each	 separate	 disciplinary	 episteme	 and	 thus	 lay	 bare	 its	existential	crisis.	And	if,	perchance,	a	discipline	cannot	survive	this	operation—so	be	it.	Perhaps,	after	all,	its	death	has	been	long	overdue.			 Let	me	 furnish	 this	proposal	with	 three	scenes	 from	my	recent	and	current	research.			 Scene	 one.	 We	 are	 in	 Lahore,	 Punjab,	 Pakistan	 and	 we	 move	 through	 a	discursive	 maze	 of	 meanings	 and	 beings	 intersecting	 at	 or	 coalescing	 around	 the	terms-of-art	of	our	 ‘science’	such	as	 ‘gender’,	 ‘religion’	and	 ‘sexuality’.	We	are,	as	 it	were,	 productively	 lost,	 so	 as	 to	 be	 found—nay,	 reborn—into	 the	 field,	 as	 if	 there	ever	 were	 a	 field.	 The	 field,	 well,	 it	 is	 diverse.	 So	 many	 expressions,	 we	 note,	 of	gender-variance,	 of	 sexual	 plurality,	 of	 syncretic	 practices	 within	 and	 between	religions.	Dividualities,	in	a	Stratherian	sense,	both	human	and	non-human,	abound.	Listen	 to	 Kajol:	 ‘Here	 in	 Pakistan,	 we	 say	 khwajasara.	 It’s	 a	more	 respectful	 term	than	the	others.	We	become	khwajasara	when	a	spirit,	called	murid,	enters	us’.	She	touches	her	chest	and	smiles	placidly.	 ‘Once	murid	 is	within	oneself,	one	feels	very	special	about	oneself	and	then	one	can	consider	oneself	khwajasara’.	Kajol	lives	with	other	khwajasara	 in	 Lahore’s	 inner	 city	 slums.	 There	 is	 a	 canal	 that	 separates	 the	urban	 poor	 from	 those	 who	 are	 better	 off.	 On	 the	 other	 side	 lives	 Jamila,	 a	community	leader.	‘Somebody	will	always	ask	that	class-related	question’,	she	says,	‘for	which	I	don’t	have	an	answer:	“Why	don’t	we	work	with	those	kinds	of	people?	Why	don’t	we	go	across	the	canal?”	And	the	answer	to	this	is	always:	“How	do	we	do	that?”	Because,	the	thing	is,	you	can	walk	into	the	old	city	and	say:	“We	are	here	to	liberate	you”.	But	that’s	neither	an	ethical	nor	a	viable	option.	You	have	to	be	aware	
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that	we	do	not	represent	the	queers	of	Pakistan.	We	just	represent	the	people	who	we	
are’.		 Scene	two.	We	are	still	 in	Lahore,	 in	a	busy	home	of	a	Supreme	Court	 judge	who	is	also	an	expert	on	the	Punjabi	qisse,	or	epic-romances.	 ‘If	you	meet	with	any	senior	citizen	here,	aged	65	or	above’,	he	says,	‘they	will	be	able	to	discuss	with	you	any	topic,	including	law,	with	references	to	the	leading	lights	of	our	tradition.	I	often	converse	with	one	such	person.	And,	when	I	ask	him,	how	much	had	he	studied,	he	answers,	“I’m	illiterate”.	What	he	means	is	that	he	hasn’t	had	any	formal	schooling,	and	yet	he	has	been	educated	in	these	things	and	he	has	a	much	more	intelligent	look	into	the	issues	than	our	very	erudite	legal	scholars	and	judges	[…].	He	knows	Waris	Shah—pages	and	pages	of	Waris	Shah—by	heart’.	The	 judge	has	also	 this	much	 to	say	 about	 the	 state	 of	 affairs	 of	 Pakistani	 law:	 ‘The	 formal	 court	 mechanism	 has	become	very	oppressive,	exploitative	system,	used	mainly	by	those	who	are	affluent	and	 influential	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 oppress	 their	 opponents,	 who	 are	 less	 privileged,	 less	affluent,	less	moneyed.	It’s	very,	very	pernicious	system	[…].	I	would	say,	it	needs	to	
be	abolished.	It	is	that	pernicious;	it	is	that	bad.’		 Scene	three.	We	are	back,	somehow,	 in	eighteenth-century	Senegambia.	We	think	we	 stand	 before	 a	 Bamana	 jeli,	 or	 griot,	who	 sings	 the	 songs	 of	 the	 gender-variant	water-spirit,	 called	Faro.	 Faro,	 the	 song	 suggests,	 brought	 order	out	 of	 the	original	chaos;	created	the	seven	heavens;	killed	Teliko,	the	spirit	of	the	hot	winds	of	the	 desert;	 and	 produced	 the	 first	 human	 beings	 by	 impregnating	 themself	 and	bearing	twins.	Faro,	the	jeli	recounts,	also	gave	the	first	humans	the	power	of	speech.	The	 song	 further	 instructs	 that	 male	 and	 female	 human	 reproductive	 organs	 are	represented	by	the	numbers	3	and	4,	respectively.	The	number	7	is,	thus,	the	perfect	number,	representing	the	androgynous	unity	of	 the	world.	That’s	why,	 the	 jeli	 tells	us,	the	male-born	Bamana	‘wear	three	rings	of	copper	on	the	right	ear	and	four	on	the	 left’.	 The	 jeli,	 themself,	 is	 free	 from	 gender	 and	 sings	 in	 a	 genderless	 Mandé	language.	 This	 jeli,	 however,	will	 soon	 embark	 on	 a	 life-changing	 journey	 through	the	horrors	of	the	Middle	Passage.	The	jeli	will	emerge	eventually	on	the	other	side	of	 the	 Atlantic,	 in	 French	 Louisiana:	 nameless,	 voiceless,	 with	 a	 body	 and	 tongue	gendered	 against	 their	 will.	 And	 the	 archives,	 as	 is	 their	 custom,	 will	 keep	 their	deadly	silence.			 My	methodological	and	theoretical	orientations	have	always	tended	towards	the	 epistemological	 and	what	 I	 termed,	 clumsily	 and	not	 unproblematically,	 in	my	last	book	on	those	Lahori	scenes	and	subjectivities,	as	‘vernacular	knowledge’.	With	it,	I	wanted	to	displace	what,	in	the	description	of	this	panel,	has	been	named	as	the	liberal	imaginary.	I	am,	however,	 interested	in	the	provocation	of	the	ontological—but	only,	I	must	say,	inasmuch	as	it	interrogates	the	limits	of	our	discursive	senses	of	being-in-the-world	 and,	 concomitantly,	 as	 I	 earlier	 proposed,	 the	 limits	 of	 our	disciplinary	designations.			 In	 anthropology	 at	 least,	 those	 who	 subscribe	 to	 the	 so-called	 ‘ontological	turn’	 have	 indeed	 proposed	 that	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 ontological	 does	 not	 need	 to	presume	any	guiding	ontology	in	the	background.	Rather,	so	goes	the	adage,	posing	the	ontological	questions	is	really	about	probing	the	discipline’s	ends,	which,	in	turn,	can	 lead	 to	 greater	 reflexivity	 and	 creativity	 or,	 alternatively,	 to	 the	 birth	 of	 an	altogether	 different	 area	 of	 study,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 with	 ‘pragmatology’	 that	 would	apparently	emerge	if	we	were	to	seriously	begin	to	 ‘think	from	things’	and	not	just	
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‘with	them’,	as	it	was	earlier	proposed.	However,	whilst	intrigued	by	the	ontological,	I	think	one	must	be	cautious	with	any	full	‘turn’	towards	it,	given	its	heavy	baggage	in	 continental	 philosophy.	 And,	 even	 if	 this	 baggage	 is	 somehow	 displaced	 by	 a	strictly	methodological	approach,	professing	no	originatory	ontology	of	 its	own	(or	creating	one	anew	 in	 the	process),	 one	must	be	wary	of	 an	 ‘ontic	 effect’	 such	 turn	might	have	on	any	subject	of	inquiry	it	seeks	to	elucidate.			 In	other	words,	I	do	not	say	that	Kajol-cum-murid	from	our	first	scene	is	not	as	 such,	 and	 that	my	 assigning	 her	 a	multiplicity	 of	 categories	 of	 personhood	will	somehow	ever	do	 the	 job,	whatever	 the	 job	 is	 (and,	 I	 posit,	 it	 never	quite	 is	mere	ethnographic	description),	but	the	moment	my	story,	as	that’s	what	it	ultimately	is,	begins	to	revolve	around	the	issues	of	presumed	ontological	difference,	I’ll	gradually	begin	 to	 loose	 sight	 of	 the	 very	 worldings	 that	 suggest	 both	 intersubjective	 and	interobjective	messiness	of	all	things	in	life,	and	therefore	makes	multiple	lifeworlds	possible—for	they	never	quite	fully	are.	If	this	is	an	ontology	of	its	own,	then	it	is	a	very	loose	and	largely	indeterminate	one,	perhaps	but	an	ontology	in	the	permanent	making	and	unmaking.	And,	I	dare	propose,	it	works	better	in	challenging	the	liberal	imaginary	than	an	‘ontological	turn’	that,	as	its	proponents	have	recently	suggested,	in	order	not	to	become	a	conservative	force,	needs	constant	rejuvenation,	reflexivity	and	 experimentation	with	itself	 as	well	 as	with	 that	what’s	 observed	 ‘in	 the	 field’.	For,	even	when	one	simply	cannot	cross	the	epistemic	canal,	as	Jamila	couldn’t,	and	when	such	inability	carries	certain	ontic	consequences	(after	all,	she	says,	‘[w]e	just	represent	the	people	who	we	are’),	there	is	still	hope	that	such	crossings	will	become	possible—ethically	and	otherwise.	This	hope	is	rooted	not	in	the	force	of	the	liberal	imaginary	 that	might	 eventually	 conquer	 all	 difference,	 but	 in	 the	 resilience	 of	 its	many	 alternatives	 in	 Lahore’s	 plural	 lifeworlds—a	 resilience	 born	 out	 of	 many	spillages	of	both	ontic	and	epistemic	nature	that	may	ultimately	breach	the	canal.	To	account	 for	 that	 breach,	 though,	 one	 might	 need	 to	 abandon	 the	 presupposed	alterity	 of	 the	 observed,	 and	with	 it,	 provincialise	 the	 place	 one	 comes	 from,	 as	 it	were,	to	‘observe’.			 Observing	 worlding	 legalities,	 even	 if	 in	 the	 mode	 of	 critical	 legal	 inquiry,	also	comes	at	the	cost	of	reaching	the	limits	of	the	observable,	and	with	it,	the	limits	of	the	knowable.	It	calls	for	a	keen	observer,	as	with	our	Punjabi	verse-loving	judge	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Pakistan,	to	search	for	an	exit.	This	exit,	however,	appears	to	be	already	premeditated	in	legal	terms,	so	that	a	pernicious	legal	system	can	only	be	displaced	with	another,	even	if	that	other	system	is	more	earthly	and	poetic	and,	one	would	hope,	more	just.	But,	what	if	the	alternative	that	has	just	emerged	in	front	of	 his	 eyes,	 with	 his	 elderly	 companion	 holding	 firmly	 onto	 the	 vernacular	knowledge	of	the	past,	 is	about	values,	perhaps,	but	ultimately	not	 legal	at	all?	Can	there	be	 an	outside	of	 law	 for	 a	 trained	 legal	 seeker?	Could	we	 call	 it,	 if	we	must,	alegality?			 What	I	think	is	gained	by	displacing	legality	from	the	immediate	horizon	of	a	legal	 theorist	 is	precisely	an	ability	to	challenge	the	 liberal	 imperative	to	seek,	and	therefore	 find,	 only	 certain	 types	 of	 normativity	 and	 order	 in	 the	many	worlds	 it	roams	 in.	 An	 outside	 provides	 for	 the	 way	 to	 be	 otherwise,	 to	 think	 from	 an	otherwise,	 but	 not	 so	 as	 to	 reassert	 an	 ontic	 difference	as	such.	 Spillages,	 linkages	and	altogether	messy	worldings	are	still	possible.	And	can	be	a	matter	of	concern	for	legal	 scholars.	 To	 redeploy	 law	 everywhere,	 even	 if	 only	 conceptually,	 means,	
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ultimately,	to	reassert	its	epistemic	force,	and	with	it,	its	claim	for	an	ontic	primacy,	which	in	turn	makes	people	like	our	Lahori	judge	pretty	desperate	in	the	end.			 Whilst	attention	to	the	ontological	may	be	helpful	inasmuch	as	it	poses	anew	the	 question	 of	 the	 disciplinary	 limit,	 including	 the	 very	 limitations	 of	 such	 an	attempt,	 it	does	not	seem	to	be	able	to	provide	for	an	 interruption	 in	the	epistemic	hierarchies	implicit	in	the	social	sciences	and	humanities	in	and	of	the	global	north.	And	 such	 hierarchies	 are	 perhaps	 nowhere	 so	 plain	 as	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 history,	which	keep	the	gender-variant	Senegambian	jeli	so	firmly	out	of	sight,	so	far	behind	the	 carefully	arranged	 layers	of	 an	archival	order.	What	 this	order	preserves	 is,	 of	course,	not	just	the	liberal	imaginary	but	also	what	counts	as	both	epsitemically	and	ontically	 possible.	 Still,	 here	 and	 there,	 sometimes,	 a	 modest	 insurrectionary	fragment	 survives	 and	 comes	 forth.	 With	 it,	 the	 shadow	 of	 the	 jeli	 makes	 brief	appearance.	The	archive	cannot	be	taken	as	it	is.	It	has	to	be	interrupted.			 Interruption	is	not	just	a	wilful	act	of	the	researcher	to	break	away	from	the	silences	of	what’s	archived	as	evidence,	or	what	counts	as	evidence,	in	our	‘research-worlds’.	Nor	 is	 it	 just	a	challenge	posed	in	working	with	the	absences	produced	by	the	logics	of	the	colonial	archivist	and	the	historians	who	followed	in	their	footsteps.	The	eighteenth-century	Senegambian	jeli	was,	in	many	ways,	a	living	interruption	to	the	imperial	orders	of	human	personhood,	an	interruption	whose	presence	revealed	certain	less-obvious	inconsistencies	in	those	orders.	So,	the	jeli’s	name	just	needed	to	be	forgotten,	their	voice	muted,	their	body	and	tongue	gendered	differently.	What’s	needed	now,	then,	 in	order	to	turn	the	tables,	 is	an	archaeology	of	 interruption,	an	ecology	of	insurrection;	a	history	not	just	from	below	but	beyond,	a	history	turn	on	itself.			 In	 Saidiya	Hartman’s	 vocabulary,	 this	 act	 is	 called	 critical	 fabulation	 and	 it	stands	for	making	productive	sense	of	the	gaps	and	silences	in	the	archive	of	trans-Atlantic	slavery	that	absent	the	voices	of	the	enslaved,	including	through	the	use	of	fictional	 narrative.	 I	 personally	 do	 not	 think	 that	 interruption	 need	 to	 include	fictionalisation;	 rather,	 the	 very	 logic	 of	 what	 counts	 as	 historical	 and	 what	 as	fictional,	 what	 writes	 itself	 into	 the	 past,	 over	 and	 over	 again,	 in	 order	 to	 write	others	 firmly	 outside	 of	 it—the	 logic	 of	 the	 imperial	 and	 its	 corresponding	personhoods—needs	to	be	interrupted	and	inverted.			 It	is	in	this	sense,	then,	that	one	could	probe	the	limits	of	the	disciplinary,	and	with	 it,	 the	 limits	 of	 what	 counts	 as	 both	 episemically	 and	 ontically	 possible.	 An	outside	to	our	research-worlds	might	signal	a	wonderful	beginning	of	many	hitherto	hidden	worldings.	Or	it	might	just	mean	an	end.	If	the	latter	be	case,	I	don’t	think	it’s	worth	 preserving	 a	 discipline	 at	 any	 cost.	 As	we	 have	 seen,	 the	 unknowable,	 as	 it	were,	indeed	sits	amidst	every	disciplinary	episteme,	and	its’	probing	may	reveal	an	epistemic	abyss.	But	this	abyss,	I	propose,	is	a	good	thing.	Without	it,	we	might	not	be	able	 to	see	beyond	 the	erected	Potemkin	villages	of	our	social	 sciences	and	 the	humanities.				 London,	October	2017	
